

Conservatism in a 2AFC Task

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
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
INTRODUCTION

- Optimality in detection tasks:
Optimal criterion (c) maximizes expected gain (EG)



$$\beta = p(x=c | S+N) / p(x=c | N)$$

- Conservatism in detection tasks with asymmetric payoffs or priors¹: β closer to 1 than the optimal β that maximizes EG



- β is closer to optimal with asymmetric priors than with asymmetric payoffs².
- Does the same pattern of conservatism occur in a 2-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) task?

METHOD

- Task: Indicate which noise patch contains the Gabor.




- Central fixation cross
- Trials with saccades excluded
- Stimulus duration: 200 ms
- Gabor contrast adjusted per subject to yield $d' = .5, 1, 2$

Asymmetric Payoffs

- 5 reward conditions, between blocks

Target pos'n	Observer response	
	L	R
L	100	-100
R	-100	40, 65, 100, 160, 250


- 3 d' conditions, between blocks



- Equal priors: $p(\text{Target on Right}) = .5$

Asymmetric Priors

- 5 prior conditions, between blocks






- Equal rewards:

Target pos'n	Observer response	
	L	R
L	100	-100
R	-100	100




- Asymmetric payoff and prior conditions in separate sessions. 15 blocks / session.

RESULTS

Asymmetric Payoffs



Asymmetric Priors



CONCLUSIONS

- Observers display conservatism in a 2AFC task.
- β is closer to optimal with asymmetric payoffs than with asymmetric priors contrary to typical results.

References
1. Green, D.M. & Swets, J.A. (1967). Signal detection theory and psychophysics. New York: Wiley.
2. Healy, A.F. & Kubovy, M. (1981). Probability matching and the formation of conservative decision rules in a numerical analog of signal detection. Journal of Experimental Psychology, HL&M, 7(5), 344-354.

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